Firms compete by choosing both a price and a design from a family of designs that can be represented as demand rotations. Consumers engage in costly sequential search among …rms. Each time a consumer pays a search cost he observes a new o¤ering. An o¤ering consists of a price quote and a new good, where goods might vary in the extent to which they are good matches for the consumer. In equilibrium, only two designstyles arise: either the most niche where consumers are likely to either love or loathe the product, or the broadest where consumers are likely to have similar valuations. In equilibrium, di¤erent …rms may simultaneously o¤er both design-styles. We perform comparative statics on the equilibrium and show that a fall in search costs can lead to higher industry prices and pro…ts and lower consumer surplus. Our analysis is related to discussions of how the internet has led to the prevalence of niche goods and the "long tail" phenomenon.
Introduction
Firms, through their choices of marketing and product design, have some ability to a¤ect the nature of demand that they face. A growing literature, notably Johnson and Myatt (2006) and Lewis and Sappington (1994) , has considered these decisions. More recently, Bar-Isaac, Caruana and Cuñat (2008, 2009 ) put more emphasis on consumers'informationgathering decisions and highlight that these are co-determined with the …rm's pricing and marketing strategies in equilibrium. This literature has focused on monopoly settings, instead this paper is one of the …rst to extend the analysis to a competitive environment. This leads to a wide variety of results that shed light on the coexistence of niche goods with mass market strategies, the related "long tail" phenomenon, and popular discussions on the e¤ects of the internet.
In order to introduce competition among …rms and allow for consumer informationgathering in analytically tractable way, we build on an established and well-explored model which considers consumers who search both to obtain price-quotes and to learn about the extent to which di¤erentiated goods suit them (Wolinsky, 1986 ; Bakos, 1997; Anderson and Renault, 1999) . Antecedents of these and related models of search have a long history in industrial organization (see for example, Stiglitz, 1989) . Recently, and with the perception that the internet should lead to falling search costs, there has been renewed academic and popular interest in consumer search and in such search models. 1 In particular, Anderson (2004 Anderson ( , 2006 sparked widespread interest and discussion of how changes in production and search technologies have changed the pattern of sales and the market shares of the most popular goods as compared to fringe goods in the "long tail". This discussion both builds on previous academic work and has sparked further exploration (see Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith (2006) for a discussion and further references).
Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith (2006) also suggest that "the Long Tail will change the kinds of products that are pro…table". This paper formally exploring this idea, contributing to this debate.
Formally, we consider …rms that compete by choosing price and "design" along the lines of Johnson and Myatt's (2006) model of a monopoly rotating demand: Here, competitive …rms can choose designs from a range which vary between broad market designs that are ino¤ensive to all consumers, or more niche or quirky designs which are either loved or loathed. 2 Consumers search among …rms in a way that is standard in models of costly sequential search: Each consumer can pay a small cost to obtain a price-quote from an additional …rm and learn about the extent to which the product o¤ered by that …rm is well-suited to his tastes.
The model generates a number of simple and interesting results. First, …rms choose extremal product designs; that is, either a most broad-based design or a most niche design.
Moreover, for su¢ ciently low search costs, all …rms choose the most niche designs available.
Further, as is common in search models, but perhaps less noted in popular discussions, search costs and scale e¤ects have very di¤erent e¤ects on outcomes.
Perhaps, most striking are the results at intermediate levels of search costs where we illustrate that both kinds of extremal designs might co-exist: Some …rms choose a broadbased design and pricing strategy, while all other …rms choose a niche strategy. Thus, the model predicts that sales and price distributions should be bi-modal, as suggested by Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) . While other models can generate similar patterns, they do so through assuming di¤erences in the productivity of …rms either exogenously as in ( Further, by allowing for an endogenous choice of product designs we are able to analyze the combined e¤ects of decreasing search costs on prices, both directly, through increased competition, and indirectly, through a higher prevalence of niche designs. The e¤ect of more niche designs on price can overcome the e¤ect of competition, thus leading to prices, pro…ts and welfare being non monotonic in search costs. There is a clear intuition: With low search costs, and consumers visiting many stores, …rms have to o¤er consumers something very attractive not only in terms of price, but also in terms of the utility that the good provides. This latter consideration leads …rms to choose niche designs, but e¤ectively these niche designs di¤erentiate …rms and so soften price competition.
Some of these results echo intuitions that have appeared elsewhere in the literature. In particular, Kuksov (2004) presents a duopoly model where consumers know the varieties available (but not their location) prior to search and di¤erent designs come with di¤erent costs associated and Cachon, Terwiesch and Xu (forthcoming) focus speci…cally on multiproduct …rms, where consumers search costlessly within a …rm but at some cost between …rms. Our model allows for a continuum of designs and much more general demand speci…cation and, moreover, in marked contrast to these papers, highlights the emergence of asymmetric market structures where broad and niche designs co-exist with no …rms that seek intermediate design strategies.
Model
There is a continuum of …rms of measure 1. Each …rm produces a single product. There is a continuum of consumers of measure m. Each consumer, l, has tastes described by a conditional utility function (not including any search costs) of the form
if she buys product i at price p i . The term " li can be interpreted as a match value between consumer l and product i. Here " li is the realization of a random variable with distribution function F i . We assume that realizations of the " li are independent. 3 Note that in this speci…cation, we assume that the consumer is risk neutral.
A consumer incurs a search cost c to learn the price p i charged by any particular …rm i as well as her match value " li for the product sold by that …rm. Consumers search sequentially. The utility of a consumer l is given by
if she buys product k at price p k at the kth …rm she visits.
As is standard in the search literature (and will become clear later), a consumer's search and purchase behaviour can be described by a threshold rule U : she buys the current product obtaining u li (p i ) if this is less or equal than U ; and continues searching otherwise. 3 Taking these realizations to be independent, while consistent with the previous literature on search models (Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999) ) is not without loss of generality insofar as it does not permit us to model di¤erent …rms attempting to target di¤erent niches. That is, there is no spatial notion of di¤erentiation or product positioning. However, given that we assume a continuum of …rms and no ability for consumers to determine location in advance, this assumption may be more reasonable. Some of the outcomes are similar to the ones of a spatial model (see Bakos, 1997 ).
We introduce the notion of design by supposing that the distribution of consumer tastes at a given …rm F i is …rm speci…c. The …rm picks a design s from a set S = [B; N ] and a design leads to a distribution of consumer tastes F s ( ) with support on some interval ( s ; s ) and logconcave densities f s ( ). Regardless of design, the …rm produces goods at a marginal cost of 0.
The strategy for each …rm i, therefore, consists not only of a choice of price p i but (in a departure from Wolinsky (1986) , Bakos (1997) and Anderson and Renault (1999) ) also a choice of a product design s i 2 S. We suppose that there are no costs associated with choosing di¤erent designs s.
We follow Johnson and Myatt (2006) in supposing that di¤erent product designs induce demand rotations. Formally, there is a family of rotation points The notion of a demand rotation essentially is a formal approach to the notion that some designs lead to a wider spread in consumer valuations than others. In particular, a higher value of s should be interpreted as a more "quirky" product which appeals more to some consumers and less to others.
Note that, although we assume that many …rms can choose the same type of product design s, this is not to say that from consumer's perspective their products are the same, since at each …rm she would get a new realization from the distribution F s .
Our notion of equilibrium is Nash in consumer and …rm strategies. 4 Speci…cally, consumers choose a threshold U , while …rms choose a pair (p; s). Given that all …rms are alike, they will all choose the same strategy if there is one that dominates the rest. In case of indi¤erence, we will describe the equilibrium as a mixed strategy one, that is, as if each …rm chooses an element from 2 (R [B; N ]). Note that this is equivalent to having each …rm choosing a pure strategy and the distribution of these pure strategies being :
Finally, note that there always exist equilibria where consumers do not search and …rms choose prohibitively high prices. We do not consider such equilibria if others exist.
Consumer behaviour
Suppose that a consumer expect …rms to choose strategy . When the consumer currently holds a best o¤er with utility U , then if the consumer samples another …rm and …nds a product with price p and match value ", she will prefer it only if p + " > U . In this case the additional utility obtained is " (U + p) and so the expected incremental utility from searching one more …rm that is expected to have design s and price p is
It is, therefore, worth searching exactly one more …rm if and only if the expected value of a search is worth more than the cost. That is, as long as E [g s;p (U )] c, or, equivalently, if U < U where U is implicitly de…ned by:
Note that there is at most one solution to (4), since the left hand side is strictly decreasing in U . However, for c large enough, there is no U that satis…es (4): If c is su¢ ciently large, then no consumer would ever continue searching and …rms would have full monopoly power (as in Diamond, 1971) . Note that even if a consumer would prefer to continue searching given some existing o¤ering, this does not guarantee that the consumer wants to start to search at all. We will later write down the conditions for search to be initiated.
Firm pro…t maximization
Suppose that consumers are using a U threshold strategy. Consider now the …rm's problem of maximizing pro…ts by choosing (p; s): Then, a consumer who visited the …rm would choose to buy as long as she received a match " such that p + " > U . Thus, the probability of sale is 1 F s (p + U ).
Consider to be the probability that a consumer who visits another …rm j 6 = i would buy from that …rm. The expected number of consumers who visit …rm i as a …rst visit is m, a further m(1 ) visit the …rm as a second visit, m(1 ) 2 as a third visit, and so on. At each stage, consumers purchase from …rm i and exit the market with probability
We can, therefore, write demand for a …rm that chooses a design s and price p as
Then, trivially, …rm pro…ts can be written as
It is useful to de…ne p s (U ) as the …rm's pro…t-maximizing price when the consumer's threshold is U and the design strategy is s:
This price is implicitly determined as
Lemma 1 The pro…t maximizing price p s (U ) associated with a design s, when a consumer's stopping rule is given by U is uniquely de…ned and is non-increasing and continuous in U .
Proof. First note that since f s (x) is logconcave then
fs(x) is monotone decreasing in x. 5 Suppose (for contradiction) that at some value of U , p s (U ) is increasing in U , then also p s (U ) + U is increasing in U and so
fs(ps(U )+U ) = p s (U ) is decreasing in U , which provides the requisite contradiction.
Now we can write pro…ts as
and the …rm's problem is to maximize this with respect to its remaining strategic variable s. Note that neither the optimal price nor the optimal design choice depend on m or , as these are just constant factors in pro…ts 6 .
Johnson and Myatt (2006) have shown that in a monopoly model pro…ts are quasiconvex in design and so a …rm would choose an extremal design. In our environment, taking the behaviour of all other …rms as given, the residual demand that a …rm faces is still determined through a demand rotation and since the …rm is a monopolist on this residual demand the result still applies and so, in our environment, …rms chooses extremal designs.
Proposition 2 Firms choose extremal designs, that is either
Proof. The optimal design is chosen to maximize p s (U )(1 F s (p s (U ) + U )). Now, given that p s U is an a¢ ne transform of p s , it follows that D(p s ; s) as in (5) are rotation-ordered.
The proof then follows immediately from Proposition 1 in Johnson and Myatt (2006), p.
761.
To gain some intuition for this result, …rst consider the case where the optimal price at a given design s is below the point of rotation so that the pro…t-maximizing quantity is greater than the quantity at the point of rotation 1 F s ( y s ). Then, decreasing s (and so " ‡attening"out demand) will lead to a greater quantity sold even if the price is kept …xed.
Therefore decreasing s must lead to higher pro…ts.
Next consider the case where the optimal price is above the point of rotation so that the pro…t-maximizing quantity is less than the quantity at the point of rotation 1 F s ( y s ). Then, increasing s (and so "steepening"demand) will lead to a greater quantity sold even if the price is kept …xed. Therefore increasing s must lead to higher pro…ts in this case.
Using Proposition 2, we can restrict attention to equilibrium strategies in which …rms choose a broad design (p B ; B) with probability and a niche one (p N ; N ) with probability 
Equilibrium
Given all the previous analysis, we can express an equilibrium in this model as a pair (U ; ),
where U summarizes the searching and purchase behavior of consumers and determines the proportions of …rms choosing niche and broad strategies. These two parameters have to satisfy the following conditions. First, rearranging formula (4), consumers optimize their behavior when
Second, as explained above, …rms choose either a niche or broad position, or are indi¤erent between the two:
and third, p B (U ) and p N (U ) are determined by (8) as
As we have already pointed out, we are interested in equilibria in which consumers do initiate their search for a product. In order to determine the relevant condition, it is convenient to compute …rst the equilibrium probability that a consumer purchases at a particular …rm:
Now, we can express the expected value of initiating search V ( ; U ) as
Thus, one needs to check that
In the next sections we characterize the equilibrium in detail depending on whether this is in mixed or pure strategies. We consider …rst the pure strategy equilibria and then the mixed ones. Note that there are two possibilities to consider in pure strategies. One in which all …rms choose a broad design (B), and another in which all …rms choose a niche one (N ). We then seek to further understand the e¤ect of a change in search costs c on the the …rm equilibrium strategies, as well as on pro…ts and consumer surplus.
All broad equilibrium
In this case the equilibrium can be expressed as (U ; ) = (U B ; 1); where U B is implicitly characterized by (10) , which now becomes:
Since the right hand side of (17) is decreasing in U B + p B (U B ), and U B + p B (U B ) is monotonic in U B (following a similar argument to Lemma 1), there is a unique solution for (17) . Note that U B depends on c.
In order for this pair (U B ; 1) to be an equilibrium, one needs to make sure …rms do not want to deviate to a design N , with its corresponding price p N (U B ). That is,
It is convenient to de…ne U as the value at which (18) holds with equality; that is, it is implicitly de…ned by:
Up to this point, we have not ruled out that there may be many solutions for U , though we will do so below.
Associated with U , it is convenient to de…ne
Thus, c B is the search cost that induces the consumer behaviour (reservation threshold) U when in equilibrium all …rms choose a broad design and price accordingly: When all …rms choose a broad design, and the search cost is c B then (by de…nition of U ) the deviation condition (18) is just binding.
Finally, we need to make sure that the consumer wants to start the search process at all. Using, the expression derived in (16), here, this condition is
We can now summarize all the above in the following proposition.
Proposition 3
The unique solution to consumer behaviour and its corresponding equilibrium prices, as determined by (17) and (12), constitute an All Broad Equilibrium if and only if c c B and it is worthwhile for consumers to initiate search, as captured by (21) .
Proof. To prove the existence of the All Broad equilibrium one needs to show that (18) is satis…ed.
First consider some solution to (19) , and call this particular solution U .
Note that
where the equality follows from the de…nition of U and the inequality follows from the de…nition of p N (:) as the pro…t-maximizing price.
It follows that
Similarly
, and so
We use these fact to show that
Suppose (for contradiction) that p N (U ) < p B (U ). Note that since N and B are drawn from a family of demand rotations, it follows that there is some b
Next, returning to the maximization problem, we can rewrite p B (U ) and p N (U ) as the solutions to the maximization problems explicitly and so re-write (19) as:
As usual, by the envelope theorem and the FOC of the previous problems we know
) for both i = B; N: Now, as argued above
Since U is monotonic and decreasing in c, for higher values of c we have lower values U .
And for lower values of U than U , B grows faster than N :Thus, the …rm's no deviation condition is satis…ed (locally) for c c B and violated (locally) for c < c B .
Finally, consider the uniqueness of U .
Suppose (for contradiction) that there exists a c for which there are many solutions to (19) . Consider the two highest solutions and label them U 1 > U 2 . We know that locally, (by the continuity of U as de…ned in (4) in c) there exists a search cost c 0 just below the search cost c that induces U (c 0 ) > U 2 and the no deviation condition (18) fails. Similarly, there exists some other c 00 such that U 1 > U (c 00 ): Since all functions are continuous, there must exist some U such that U 1 > U (c 00 ) > U > U (c 0 ) > U 2 which satis…es (19) . But this contradicts that U 1 and U 2 were the two highest solutions.
All niche equilibrium
First, we can directly assure the existence of an All Niche equilibrium for su¢ ciently small searching costs:
Proposition 4 When c is su¢ ciently small, then, in equilibrium, all …rms choose a most niche product design s = N .
Proof. We know that U is de…ned as
and that …rms maximize
Note that as c tends to zero U + p B (U ) tends to B and U + p N (U ) tends to N :This implies that ( ; U ), as de…ned in (14) tends to zero.
Suppose for contradiction that when c tends to 0 then U < T < B . Then, since U + p B (U ) tends to B , it must be that p B (U ) > > 0 for some constant . A …rm by choosing s = B and p B = would achieve unbounded pro…ts yielding a contradiction. In particular this contradiction shows that as c tends to zero U > T for T < B arbitrarily close to B .
Now consider a …rm that chooses design B and price p B for all c, with positive probability. We consider a deviation to a design N and a price p B which we claim gives strictly higher pro…ts for c small enough. Here, equilibrium pro…ts are
and deviation pro…ts are p B m ( ; U )
(1 F N (p B + U )).
Since U ! B then U > y B for c low enough and, given our de…nition of a demand rotation, then (1 F N (p B + U )) > (1 F B (p B + U ) ). So this is a pro…table deviation and we reach a contradiction, which leads us to conclude that must be equal to 0.
Next, we can replicate the analysis above for the all niche equilibrium. The analogous conditions in the niche case are as follows: U N is de…ned implicitly by:
where
The no deviation condition now corresponds to deviating to a broad design and is:
Note that this holds with equality U N = U . We can de…ne c N as follows
and the equivalent condition to (21) is:
Furthermore, analogous to Proposition 3, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5 There exists an All Niche Equilibrium if and only if c c N and it is
worthwhile for consumers to initiate search, as captured by (31).
Proof. It follows trivially from the proof of 3 that if there is some c 0 for which an all niche equilibrium exists then an all niche equilibrium exists if and only if c c N ; however, Proposition 4 guarantees that there is some c 0 for which an all niche equilibrium exists.
Mixed Strategy Equilibria
In a mixed strategy equilibrium, where both N -designs and B-designs are chosen with non-trivial probabilities, a …rm must be indi¤erent between the two designs so that
This implicitly de…nes the optimal consumer strategy to the previously de…ned value of U : Using (20) and (30), we can rewrite (10) as: Secondly, we show that mixed strategy equilibria can arise in Appendix B.
Conclusions and Extension
We brie ‡y summarize the discussion and relate it to the introductory motivation before highlighting a number of further considerations and extensions.
Summary This paper presents a simple and tractable model integrating consumer search and …rms' strategic product design choices. Equilibrium can be characterized relatively simply insofar as …rm and consumer behaviour can be separately analyzed and the …rms' strategic interactions arise only through consumer behaviour. Since there is a continuum of …rms, each one has only a negligible e¤ect on consumer behaviour. Thus, we are able to make signi…cant progress in characterizing the equilibrium even without having to impose much structure on the functional form for demand.
The characterization is of some considerable interest in itself. Even though, all …rms are ex-ante identical, an asymmetric industry outcome can arise where …rms take very di¤er-ent approaches-some taking a "broad-market" strategy, seeking a very broad design and choosing a relatively low price and others taking a "niche" strategy with quirky products This observation, and the comparative statics of the equilibrium with respect to consumer search costs can be brought to bear in considering demand-side explanations for the "long tail" e¤ect of the internet. As search costs fall, a greater proportion of …rms choose the "niche" strategy, and, in part, due to the di¤erent industry structure, but in part also since it is cheaper for consumers to more easily seek better-suited products, niche …rms account for a larger proportion of the industry's sales. Note, that in contrast to much discussion surrounding scale or production cost e¤ects, we assume that production technologies do not vary and are identical in terms of costs.
In addition, the comparative statics results are interesting in highlighting that prices (and pro…ts) can be non-monotonic in consumer search costs. There is an intuitive rationale: As search costs fall, then as long as the product designs remain unchanged, prices fall. However, at ever lower prices, the "broad-market" strategy becomes less appealing to …rms, some of whom adopt a "niche" strategy, charging a high price to the (few) consumers who are well-matched for the product. Moreover, the …rms' choosing to adopt a niche strategy e¤ectively impose a positive externality on other …rms, since this choice of a niche strategy e¤ectively acts as a form of di¤erentiation that softens price competition.
Endogenous Firm Entry One can endogenize the proportion of consumers per …rm, that is m by assuming an entry cost and allowing for a free entry condition. As discussed on page 7, scale (as captured by m) has no e¤ect at all on …rms'equilibrium prices and designs.
So, as a consequence, the characterization of the equilibrium strategies (and of consumer surplus) is identical to the analysis in Section (3). The sole e¤ect of endogenizing entry would be that net pro…ts for …rms would be zero and rather than characterizing equilibrium pro…ts, we would characterize the number of …rms (that is, the ratio of …rms per consumer)
in the industry. Note in particular that high pro…ts in the case of an exogenous number of …rms corresponds to a high ratio of …rms per consumer when entry is endogenous.
Coordinated industry behaviour In the model, …rms take their actions separately but their choices have consequences for all other …rms in the industry. There is, therefore, a rationale to try to coordinate on industry-level responses and attempt to internalize the externalities that arise.
In particular, since pro…ts can be non-monotonic in search costs, as search costs fall exogenously the industry might bene…t from further reducing search costs. Thus an industry response to the internet (which we may plausibly consider as an exogenous fall in consumer search costs) is to provide additional enabling technologies (such as industrysponsored comparison sites) that further reduce search costs for consumers.
Prominence and search order A small and recent literature has explored the e¤ect of prominence and search order (Arbatskaya; 2007, and Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou, 2008) .
The model can easily be adapted to suppose that some …rms are more prominent in the sense that the order of search is not identically distributed across …rms, but, instead, some particular …rms are more likely to be visited sooner in a consumers search process than others.
Such a change would have no e¤ect whatsoever on the equilibrium decision of …rms, such a notion of "prominence" is similar to a scale e¤ect. In the notation of the model, Ex-ante …rm heterogeneity and superstar e¤ects An interesting and relatively straightforward extension is to allow for ex-ante di¤erences in …rms in terms of their "natural"appeal or vertical quality. Thus, before any product tailoring or design choices, some products are simply naturally better products, with the potential to be superstars.
As discussed above, Anderson (2006) and other commentators on the e¤ects of the inter-net on sales concentration have highlighted "long tail"e¤ects; there is a parallel discussion, notably Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) arguing online retailing, has led to increased "superstar" e¤ects, with the best-selling products becoming ever-more successful. 7 Extending the model to allow for ex-ante vertical product di¤erences, can incorporate this e¤ect. When search costs are very high, however, consumers cannot locate these superior products, as search costs fall, consumers should be able to more easily …nd themsuggesting a superstar e¤ect. Note, however, that as search costs fall, the competition from the long tail may become more severe, as inferior products choose a niche strategy yielding more attractive options for some well-matched consumers. Indeed, it can be shown that both the "superstar"and the "long tail"phenomena can coexist as inferior …rms gradually switch from broad-based to niche strategies and consumers more easily …nd superior …rms.
A Example: Linear Demands
We analyze the particular case where demand is linear. We have shown already that we only need to worry about extremal product designs so we can restrict the analysis to the two linear demand functions that correspond with the most broad design (B) and the most niche design (N ). Without loss of generality, any possible family of linear demand function can be a result of having consumer types " uniformly distributed with the following structure "~U [0; s ] with probability s and " = 0 with probability (1 s ). 8 In particular it is convenient to de…ne the extremal designs (N and B) as follows: When product design is N then "~U [0; N ] with probability N and " = 0 otherwise. When product design is B then "~U [0; B ] with probability B and " = 0 otherwise. We impose that N > B and N < B in order to ensure that these are demand rotations as de…ned above (i.e. the demand curves cross once) and the N design is the most niche one.
This allows us to write
A.1 Characterization
We begin by characterizing p B (U ) and p N (U ), as in (8)
, and (35)
We turn to characterize U B (c) as implicitly de…ned in (17) . This must satisfy 8 Further, that the distributions have the same means requires an additional restriction that 
For the case where all …rms choose a broad design the condition for the consumer to ever visit a second …rm once she has visited a …rst one is the condition for the expected gain of visiting an additional …rm exceeding c when the outcome at the …rst …rm is the worst possible match. 
Analogously for the "all niche" equilibrium to exist is necessary that
Note that it is necessarily the case that 
B Example: Design Dispersion
Although we have a family of demand rotations, it is only the extremal ones that play a role when there are no design costs, so we describe only the extreme designs. We suppose that the niche N designs are such that F N (x) = 
